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ABSTRACT
Recent changes in technology and the media are causing significant changes
in how capital markets assimilate and respond to information. We identify
important themes in the disclosure literature and use this as a framework to
discuss the conference papers that appear in this volume. These papers ex-
amine how managers’ disclosure practices are being affected by changes in
technology, the media, and capital markets. While this work makes impor-
tant progress, we discuss how continuing technological change and the emer-
gence of new forms of media offer further opportunities for research on the
role of disclosure in capital markets.
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1. Introduction
Over the last two decades, the disclosure literature has emerged as one
of the most important areas in accounting research. Interest in this area
has been fueled by a growing realization among researchers that the ways
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managers communicate information about their firms has meaningful ef-
fects on capital market outcomes. These issues have become even more
critical in recent years as changes in information technology, the media,
and securities markets interact to affect the ways information about firms
is produced, disseminated, and processed. It is clear from talking to CFOs
and other practitioners that managers spend considerable time thinking
about how to manage their firms’ disclosures and that managers believe
their disclosure decisions have first-order value implications.
We provide a framework for characterizing disclosure research and use
this framework to summarize and put into broader context five papers that
were presented at the 2014 Journal of Accounting Research (JAR) confer-
ence and that appear in this issue. Our goal in discussing these papers is
to show how they fit into the preexisting literature and the framework we
present, not to provide a detailed critique of each paper. We also provide
suggestions for future research.
The conference theme was “Disclosure, the Media, and Capital Markets,”
and its aim was to bring together papers that examine how recent changes
in technology, capital markets, and the media affect and are affected by
firms’ disclosure policies. These changes include:
 The way firms file and report information to regulatory agencies. The
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) now requires firms to
file using EDGAR, which effectively provides real time access to 10-K,
10-Q, and filings required by the agency. The SEC has also mandated
the use of XBRL, which tags financial statement data electronically and
so facilitates investors’ ability to process detailed financial statement
information.
 The way the media processes and disseminates information about
firms, including the use of machine-driven algorithms that gather and
disseminate news on a continuous basis in real time.
 The emergence of Big Data.
 The emergence of social media and its use by companies as part of
their disclosure process, as well as the effect of social media more
broadly on how managers manage the information environment of
their firms given the interactive nature of these platforms.
 The increasing mobility and declining cost of computing devices with
Internet connectivity and the accompanying increased penetration of
these devices among the population at large.
 The way technology affects how capital markets process and respond
to news about firms. The last decade has seen the emergence of high-
frequency trading, dark pools, and other changes in the way price for-
mation occurs in capital markets.
While these changes affect the way that information is produced, dissemi-
nated, processed, and traded on, the underlying economic forces that affect
disclosure continue to be important. At the same time, new forces (such as
social media and increased mobility) are emerging, and these forces are
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likely to change disclosure in important ways. To better understand these
changes, it is useful to think about the disclosure literature as addressing
three broad research questions.
First, researchers seek to understand the basic decision to disclose infor-
mation: why firms voluntarily disclose information that is not mandated by
regulators. Under this heading researchers look to explain how managers
exercise their discretion over what to disclose and when to disclose it as well
as the consequences of those decisions, which usually means whether there
are beneficial capital market effects. For example, the earnings guidance
literature is really about why managers provide earnings news early, in ad-
vance of the mandated announcement date, and how those decisions affect
capital market outcomes.
Second, researchers seek to understand how managers choose to dissem-
inate information about their firms. Research on dissemination addresses
the mechanism or channel managers use to release information about their
firms and whether dissemination affects capital market outcomes such as
market liquidity, the firms’ investor base, etc. This research also addresses
the role of the media, both conventional and social, in disseminating infor-
mation, as well as whether the media creates additional content that adds to
or otherwise affects the information content of firm disclosures. Research
questions in this area are evolving as a result of changes in technology
and the media. For example, the emergence of high-frequency trading has
made the speed and mechanics of dissemination increasingly important,
while the emergence of social media means that firms’ communications
with investors are more interactive (as opposed to firms simply disseminat-
ing information to a passive audience).
Third, research addresses strategic aspects of disclosure, including
whether managers’ disclosure strategies are designed to “slant” news about
firm performance in a particular way. For example, managers can use dis-
closure to complement financial reporting strategies that are designed to
portray information about firm performance in a positive light, as when
managers call on analysts who are more likely to be favorable during confer-
ence calls or seek to report adverse earnings news in periods when investors
are paying less attention.
With this structure in mind, the following sections summarize the con-
ference papers in the context of a broader discussion of the disclosure lit-
erature. Our goal is to help readers see how the papers fit into the disclo-
sure literature in the hopes of generating future research that continues to
explore these issues. In some ways, these papers represent a first step in un-
derstanding emerging forces in disclosure such as the role of social media
and the increased penetration of mobile devices.
This discussion should in no way be construed as a comprehensive review
of the literature. Instead, the goal is to identify some useful themes in the
literature, link them to the conference papers, and explore implications for
future research.
224 G. S. MILLER AND D. J. SKINNER
2. Conference Call Research
When firms began to use conference calls to discuss their results during
the 1990s, these calls were viewed as a new form of voluntary disclosure
because: (i) not all firms held conference calls, and (ii) firms seemed to
be using these calls to increase disclosure (Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner
[1999], Tasker [1998]). Tasker’s [1998] main prediction was that managers
were more likely to use conference calls when their financial statements
were relatively less informative about their firms’ business and operations.
Consistent with this, she finds that firms whose value depends relatively
more on innovative and speculative activities were more likely to use con-
ference calls. Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner [1999] find that firms that
held conference calls were larger, more profitable, and more heavily fol-
lowed by analysts than other firms, characteristics that are often associated
with higher levels of disclosure.
Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner [1999] also examine whether conference
calls provide information to investors beyond that available from the ac-
companying press releases, and so increase disclosure. Consistent with man-
agers releasing new information during conference calls, these authors
found that prices and volumes increased during the time of the calls, which
were typically held after the accompanying press release had been dissem-
inated. This raised questions about whether conference calls, which at the
time were only available to certain analysts and other invited participants,
were a form of selective disclosure.
This early research on conference calls exemplifies a “causes and con-
sequences” pattern commonly followed by research on new forms of vol-
untary disclosure. That is, research examines why managers adopt a new
disclosure practice as well as the capital market consequences of that prac-
tice. The underlying goal is to understand the costs and benefits of each
innovation in disclosure.1
Before SEC Regulation FD came into force in October 2000, firms could
choose whether to limit access to conference calls to a small group of par-
ticipants, usually large institutional investors and security analysts who fol-
lowed the firm (“closed calls”), or make closed calls available to any in-
vestors who might be interested (“open calls”). This choice tells us about
how widely managers chose to disseminate information about their firms.
Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller [2003] investigate the determinants and ef-
fects of this decision, and find that firms with relatively more shareholders
and relatively fewer institutional holders were more likely to open their con-
ference calls. This suggests that the nature of the firm’s investor base helps
determine how widely its managers choose to disseminate information.
1 Early research on earnings guidance follows this pattern. During the 1970s and 1980s,
managers issued earnings forecasts infrequently, so researchers were interested in the forces
that led some managers to provide forecasts while others did not, as well as the market effects
of providing the forecasts (Patell [1976], Penman [1980], Lev and Penman [1990]).
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After Regulation FD led to the widespread use of open conference calls,
researchers began to examine more nuanced aspects of the way conference
calls were managed, including factors that affect the effectiveness of confer-
ence calls and how the management of calls was affected by the underlying
news being conveyed. Matsumoto, Pronk, and Roelofsen [2011] examine
more than 10,000 conference calls over 2003 to 2005 and find that the
Q&A segment of the call is generally more informative than the manage-
ment presentation segment, especially for firms with greater analyst follow-
ing and for which the earnings news being discussed was relatively poor.
An important and more general question in disclosure is whether man-
agers strategically manage the way firm performance (earnings news) is
disclosed, particularly whether managers differentially manage the disclo-
sure of good and bad news. This line of research goes back to Skinner’s
[1994] findings that there is a strong asymmetry in the extent to which
managers pre-announce earnings news (managers are significantly more
likely to pre-announce adverse earnings news than other news), and ex-
tends more generally to accounting researchers’ interest in how managers’
accounting and disclosure decisions are affected by firm performance. Ac-
counting researchers have long been interested in whether earnings are
managed to shape investors’ perceptions of firm performance (e.g., see the
large literature on income smoothing) as well as how managers’ reporting
choices are related to their incentives to characterize news in a particular
way (McVay [2006], Schrand and Walther [2000]).
The more general point to be made here is that managers’ financial re-
porting and disclosure decisions are likely to form part of an overall fi-
nancial reporting strategy designed to convey managers’ views about how
well the firms’ overall operating and business strategies are being achieved.
Further, it seems likely that the firm has an overall strategy for all of its fi-
nancial decisions, so that financial reporting and disclosure decisions are
integrated with decisions about capital structure and payout policy. In spite
of this, most research tends to view these as separate decisions—that is, ac-
counting decisions are seen as distinct from disclosure decisions, and we
generally do not consider how these decisions relate to financing or payout
decisions. Better understanding how managers integrate these decisions
seems like a useful avenue for future research.
Research on conference calls now focuses on how managers use confer-
ence calls strategically to characterize firm performance in a more favor-
able light. Mayew [2008] examines whether managers use their ability to
decide who asks questions on calls to manage analysts’ questions, and finds
that managers are more likely to call on analysts who have more favorable
recommendations and so presumably will be less critical of management.
More recent research examines managers’ speech during conference
calls. Hobson, Mayew, and Venkatachalam [2012] show that nonverbal vo-
cal cues extracted from managers’ speech during conference calls can
be used to detect deception by managers and that these cues predict
subsequently reported accounting irregularities. Larcker and Zakolyukina
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[2012] use approaches developed in linguistics to analyze the words man-
agers use during conference calls for signs of deceptive behavior, and show
that deceptive language during conference calls is associated with account-
ing irregularities as well as stock price underperformance.
The Allee and DeAngelis [2015] conference paper extends this line of
research by examining how managers distribute “tone words” in confer-
ence call disclosures. Like Larcker and Zakolyukina [2012], this research
extends a recent line of work that uses tools from linguistics to examine the
tone of narrative disclosures such as the Management Discussion and Anal-
ysis (MD&A; e.g., Li [2010], Loughran and McDonald [2011]). Tone words
are words that managers use to convey a positive or negative picture of firm
performance and prospects. Rather than simply counting tone words, Allee
and DeAngelis [2015] observe that the information content of narrative
disclosures is likely to depend on the placement of these words within docu-
ments and adopt a measure of where words are placed from the linguistics
literature. Allee and DeAngelis refer to this as tone “dispersion.” For exam-
ple, if managers were interested in emphasizing positive news about firm
performance and de-emphasizing negative news (as we generally suppose),
they might spread positive tone words throughout their prepared remarks
but place negative tone words close together.
This has an interesting similarity to financial reporting practices, such
as managers’ tendency to engage in “big bath” reporting, the strategic
placement and description of items within the income statement (McVay
[2006]), and the strategic use of earnings benchmarks (Schrand and
Walther [2000]).
Allee and DeAngelis [2015] report a number of useful findings. First,
the authors find significant persistence in tone dispersion through time,
indicating that it is likely related to firm and/or manager characteristics.
Second, the authors find that managers use dispersion strategically: the
dispersion of negative and positive tone words is related to reported per-
formance, which suggests that managers use dispersion to manage how in-
vestors perceive and respond to earnings news. Finally, the authors show
that managers’ strategic use of tone words affects analysts’ responses (as
measured by the questions they ask) and the market response to the news.
In this sense, this work complements papers such as Larcker and Zakolyuk-
ina [2012], which show that cues extracted from the language management
uses during conference calls predict performance. More generally, it shows
further evidence of strategic communication by management.
3. Disclosure and Social Media
We usually think of disclosure channels such as press releases and con-
ference calls as a way for managers to manage their firms’ information
environments by providing external constituents with better and more
timely information relevant to valuation. However, with the advent of social
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media, firms have lost a certain amount of control of their information en-
vironments in ways that are difficult to predict and manage.
While it has always been the case that the conventional media creates
content about firms (as when reporters write investigative pieces), this is
relatively unusual. Miller [2006] shows that the media identifies almost
one-third of frauds before they are announced by the firm. However, the
75 articles he identifies over a 17-year period represent a small portion of
total press coverage. The arrival of social media platforms such as Facebook
and Twitter means that many more actors can make their views about the
firm known and disseminate those views widely, potentially creating adverse
consequences for firms, especially if the actors that engage on social media
are relatively uninformed. In addition to providing more sources of news,
some observers argue that proliferation of social media will reduce interest
in and resources available to more conventional media, weakening its role
while social media becomes more important (Lau and Wydick [2014]).
So far, there is relatively little work on how firms use social media. Blanke-
spoor, Miller, and White [2014] examine how firms use Twitter to dissem-
inate firm news by providing links to press releases in their Twitter feeds.
They use the term “direct-access information technology” (DAIT) because,
unlike conventional disclosures that rely on users taking actions to access
disclosures, Twitter allows companies to “push” disclosures directly to users
and so directly disseminate news, as opposed to the more conventional ap-
proach of relying on users to access content that is disseminated through
media outlets.
Lee, Hutton, and Shu [2015] explore a different aspect of social media
by exploring how firms use social media to manage product recalls. Product
recalls represent “crises” that affect the firms’ product market in potentially
significant ways, especially if managed poorly. Product recalls naturally cre-
ate uncertainty in the minds of a large group of the firms’ customers as well
as the public at large, and typically result in negative stock price reactions
because of their adverse product market effects.
The authors examine how firms use different forms of social media, in-
cluding Facebook and Twitter, to manage the flow of information about
the recall in an attempt to minimize the associated adverse effects. There
are at least two potentially countervailing effects. First, firms can use social
media to quickly inform customers and the public at large about the recall,
minimizing the extent to which rumors and misinformation increase the
scope of the crisis (e.g., they can respond directly to negative tweets or Face-
book posts, including some that may be false or misleading). Second, how-
ever, disseminating information about the recall is a double-edged sword
in that it can also exacerbate the crisis by spreading the news to a wider
audience, potentially helping the news to go “viral.” The availability of in-
teractive social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter means that
users can themselves comment on and disseminate news about the recall,
potentially increasing the spread of negative sentiment, including misinfor-
mation. The net effect of these different forces is hard to assess ex ante.
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The authors’ results suggest that the net effect of social media is to miti-
gate the adverse effect of the recall. First, the authors report that the stock
price response to product recalls is less negative for firms that use interac-
tive social media such as Facebook and Twitter. Second, the authors look
specifically at how the use of social media by the firm and other users af-
fects the response to the recall. They find that the negative response to the
recall is exacerbated by the extent to which other users disseminate news
about the recall (as measured by the number of tweets) but that this effect
is mitigated by the extent of the firm’s efforts to address the problem (as
measured by the number of tweets sent by the firm). Overall, the evidence
suggests that, if properly managed, firms can engage users and customers
through social media to mitigate the adverse effect of “crises” associated
with product recalls, a result that potentially extends to other types of cor-
porate events. For example, one can imagine firms engaging users on social
media to mitigate investor uncertainty created by large negative earnings
surprises, a more direct and interactive form of disclosure than available
through Q&A interactions on conference calls.
The SEC has recently provided guidance that explicitly allows firms to
use social media to disseminate corporate news.2 Along with the tremen-
dous growth and penetration of social media, this makes it likely that social
media will become an increasingly important component of firms’ disclo-
sure strategies.
Social media seems like an important new strand of the literature given
its increasing use by a large cross section of society and the potential for
users to create and disseminate their own content (it may not be news)
about firms. This represents a new question in the literature because pre-
vious disclosure platforms preclude or at least limit the extent to which
investors at large can respond to and disseminate their own views about
firms.
4. Mobility
An important factor in the growth of social media is the increased avail-
ability of mobile communication devices such as smart phones that have
Internet connectivity and so allow users to interact on social media in real
time. The increasing penetration of these devices also enables users to ac-
quire, communicate, and trade on information about firms, and so, like
social media, has potentially significant effects on firms’ information envi-
ronments and capital market trading activity. The goal of Brown, Stice, and
White [2015] is to provide preliminary evidence on these effects.
To examine the effect of mobile communications, Brown, Stice, and
White [2015] exploit a set of laws that provide exogenous variation in users’
2 See http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171513574#.VM9
R3u8rfc.
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ability to use mobile devices. Specifically, these authors use the implemen-
tation of state-level distracted driver laws (which restrict the use of mobile
devices by drivers in cars) to examine the effects of the use of mobile de-
vices on the collection and diffusion of local information about firms, as
well as trading in these firms. The authors hypothesize that local investors
use mobile devices to gather and distribute information about local compa-
nies as well as to trade on this information. To test this, the authors exam-
ine whether the introduction of distracted driving laws affects information
flows and trading in local firms. This is a powerful setting because the au-
thors can examine short windows of time around the introduction of these
laws (including intraday effects), and because the timing of the introduc-
tion of these laws is plausibly exogenous with respect to corporate disclo-
sure decisions.
The authors report a number of interesting findings. First, consistent
with the use of mobile technology to access local information about local
firms, the authors find that Google search volume declines at the time these
laws are introduced and that the effect is less pronounced when laws allow
the use of hands-free technology. Second, the authors find a significant de-
cline in trading volume for local stocks after the introduction of distracted
driving laws. This effect is more pronounced when local users have longer
commutes and when commute times overlap with periods when exchanges
are open. The authors find additional effects for spreads and prices that
are related to the volume effects.
Given the authors’ setting and research design, it is difficult to imagine a
story under which the types of reverse causality or correlated omitted vari-
ables explanations that we normally worry about in disclosure research are
at play. This is especially true of the intraday results, which show a decline
in trading activity during commuting times relative to other times during
the day and relative to states that do not have these laws. The results extend
recent work that demonstrates the importance of local information flows
to smaller, local investors and how this influences trading, especially for
those stocks for which local information and trading is likely to be more
important (Engelberg and Parsons [2011], Peress [2014]). Brown, Stice,
and White [2015] show that local investors, who are likely to have greater
access to local information about firms in their locales, use mobile devices
to collect and disseminate this information, which in turn affects trading
activity in these stocks. Overall, the authors’ findings show that the in-
creased penetration of mobile technology affects local information acquisi-
tion and trading, and that there is a direct effect of this technology on these
outcomes.
5. Media
Because disclosure research often relies on the media to identify firm
disclosures, it implicitly includes the impact of media coverage in measur-
ing the effects of disclosure. Early management earnings forecast studies
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rely on The Wall Street Journal to obtain forecast data (e.g., Imhoff [1978],
Penman [1980]). In spite of this reliance on the media, until recently there
has been relatively little research that explicitly examines the actions, in-
centives, or impact of the media.
Early considerations of the role of the press were often incidental to the
broader research question. Foster [1979] examines the market response
to Barron’s publication of fundamental accounting analyses performed by
Abraham Briloff. This paper was motivated by anecdotal arguments that
negative market responses for firms discussed in these articles was a form of
market inefficiency. Foster [1987] follows up on this study, but still is unable
to provide a clear explanation for the market reaction. While both studies
include some discussion of the role of Barron’s in disseminating Briloff’s
analyses to a wider audience, they do not explicitly examine the role of
press coverage. In this way, the media literature is similar to other litera-
tures that we discuss: researchers first began using it either as a tool in their
research or as an incidental part of the study. It is now clear that the role of
the media is of interest in its own right, especially if it does more than sim-
ply disseminate news, as is possible in the Briloff example. Research on the
media has taken much longer than most other streams of the disclosure lit-
erature; for example, the conference call and earnings forecast literatures
developed in a relatively short amount of time.3 While some research on
the media has occurred, this area is still relatively undeveloped.
The earliest empirical work in accounting (of which we are aware) to
explicitly examine the determinants of media coverage—by Thompson,
Olsen, and Dietrich [1987]—uses The Wall Street Journal Index to examine
the types of firm news reported, with the goal of helping researchers under-
stand the determinants of the news coverage they were relying on to obtain
firm disclosures. Thompson, Olsen, and Dietrich [1987] find, among other
things, that larger firms are more likely to be covered by The Wall Street Jour-
nal, which is early evidence of the media’s tendency to cover larger firms to
a greater extent than smaller firms. However, the literature quickly evolved
to follow two related paths: whether the media plays a monitoring role in
capital markets and whether media coverage in and of itself affects stock
prices.
The first stream of literature argues that the media monitors manage-
ment by identifying management malfeasance through original analysis or
by bringing attention to malfeasance first identified by intermediaries such
as analysts. Miller [2006] examines whether the media identifies account-
ing irregularities that eventually lead to SEC censure via Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). This study shows that the press
often identifies such malfeasance and does so well before other interme-
diaries. However, Miller also finds that the press is more likely to play this
3 It could be that this slow development was due to difficulties in understanding the institu-
tional features of “the media,” with its many different press outlets and roles, as well as to the
difficulty of obtaining large-scale measures of press coverage.
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“watchdog” role for large firms and more salacious frauds, both of which
will likely attract greater readership (and revenues).
Core, Guay, and Larcker [2008] examine whether the press monitors
CEO compensation. They find that the press does identify excess compen-
sation, and that it is more likely to report on firms with large stock option
exercises, which the authors argue can be sensationalized. They also find
that firms do not change compensation in response to press coverage, sug-
gesting that the monitoring is not effective. A more recent study by Kuhnen
and Niessen [2012] finds that firms do reduce stock option grants to CEOs
when there is negative coverage of CEO compensation.
Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales [2008] examine Anglo-American press
coverage of Russian firms that is based on information provided by a hedge
fund (and so not due to press analyses). They find that adverse press cover-
age leads to improvements in governance and attribute this to the broader
international dissemination of the governance problems that pressures the
firm and Russian regulators to reform.
Overall, these papers suggest that the press serves a monitoring role, both
by creating content and by disseminating content generated by others.4
We see this as an important finding, but more research is warranted to
generalize and extend these findings.
The second stream of literature—which includes Sant and Zaman
[1996], Bushee et al. [2010], Engelberg and Parsons [2011], and Drake,
Guest, and Twedt [2014]—examines the role of the media in disseminat-
ing information to a wider audience. These studies attempt to minimize or
control for new information to isolate dissemination effects of the media.
These studies focus almost exclusively on the impact on prices in financial
markets. A related set of studies do not explicitly refer to dissemination, but
use a related firm visibility argument (Merton [1987]) to examine whether
the press increases the “visibility” of firms. These studies also find that press
coverage impacts pricing and market activity (Barber and Odean [2008],
Fang and Peress [2009]).5 Collectively, these studies indicate that the press
also plays an important role in dissemination.
4 The press did not create the information in the Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales [2008] pa-
per; that information was created by a hedge fund combining public and private information.
As highlighted in Foster [1979], it is difficult to determine exactly where on the continuum
information moves from being previously “private” to “public,” however it seems reasonable
to argue that this information was likely not broadly known by readers. Further, these articles,
as well as those in Miller [2006] and Core, Guay, and Larcker [2008], were written to put the
information into a broad context with other information regarding the firm. The thesis in
these long press articles likely combines previously available information in a way that was new
to the vast majority of readers—again leading to the question of whether this is new “public”
information.
5 This visibility role is also supported by several studies that examine television coverage
(Fehle, Tsyplakov, and Zdorovtsov [2005], Kim and Meschke [2011], Engelberg, Sasserville,
and Williams [2012]).
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Dai, Parwada, and Zhang [2015] combine these streams of research by
examining the monitoring role of the press when it disseminates informa-
tion in SEC filings regarding managers’ insider stock sales. They argue that,
while dissemination through the press does not create new information
(SEC filings are publicly available through EDGAR), it does distribute the
news to a wider audience and thereby creates “discipline via dissemination.”
They find that wider dissemination reduces managers’ future trading and
the profitability of the trades. They show that the disciplinary effect occurs
through three mechanisms: reduction of information asymmetry, fear of
subsequent litigation, and the capital at risk.
By demonstrating changes in managerial behavior, Dai, Parwada, and
Zhang [2015] add to our understanding of the press as a monitor. While
prior studies explicitly identify situations where the press either creates in-
formation or disseminates information created by other specialists (a hedge
fund), this paper shows that the monitoring role can be fulfilled even when
the press simply highlights nominally “public” existing information, which
is generally presented without any contextual analyses. This evidence helps
to establish the media as a monitor.
This paper extends the dissemination literature by showing that media
coverage affects subsequent manager actions. Previous papers focus largely
on the market response to broader dissemination. Those papers show that
market participants respond when information is more widely distributed,
but is largely silent on whether greater dissemination changes the actions of
other stakeholders. By showing changes in managers’ subsequent actions,
this paper deepens our understanding of the role of dissemination to play-
ers beyond the financial markets (although admittedly the impacts shown
are based on their actions within financial markets).
While Dai, Parwada, and Zhang [2015] provide meaningful insights on
both the monitoring and dissemination roles of the media, we know less
about the role of the media than we do about the role of other interme-
diaries (analysts) and monitors (auditors or institutional investors). Future
research would benefit from a more complete theory of the role of the
media in financial markets. Jensen [1979] argues that the media exists pri-
marily to entertain, and predicts that it provides little informational value
but instead chooses to report content that increases readership. Broadly
consistent with this, Gentzkow and Shapiro [2010] provide evidence that
media outlets “slant” their coverage of politics to cater to the political views
of their local readers. This seems inconsistent with evidence that shows that
the media plays monitoring and dissemination roles although evidence of
biases in media coverage support this view. Miller [2006] and Core, Guay,
and Larcker [2008] provide arguments that could help further develop a
theory of the media.
One promising approach is to consider the media’s interaction with
other players in financial markets, such as analysts, auditors, investors, etc.
Early work such as Sant and Zaman [1996] (analysts), Miller [2006] (an-
alysts and auditors), and Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales [2008] (hedge
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funds) all provide some empirical evidence of interactions between the
media and these other groups. While Dai, Parwada, and Zhang [2015] ex-
pand this to the impact on managerial actions, this area is still relatively
undeveloped. Future studies will need to provide a fuller understanding of
the institutional relationships between the media and these other capital
market participants in order to develop cleaner models. Because the me-
dia has both overlapping and differing incentives from these other players
in financial markets, a fuller understanding of the media and its relations
to these other players would contribute significantly to our overall under-
standing of information flow in financial markets.
Recent years have seen a sharp increase in the amount of published
work on the role of the media (Tetlock [2014]). This increased interest
is promising. As Tetlock points out, much of this work is driven by new
data sources such as RavenPack (which was also used by Dai, Parwada, and
Zhang [2015]). These new data sources offer opportunities but it will also
be important for researchers to be sure that we draw from a wide range
of sources that represent the full spectrum of the media. As an example,
the RavenPack product commonly used by researchers is limited to Dow
Jones sources (and Dai, Parwada, and Zhang [2015] only use news alerts).
Thus, it only captures dissemination by a single outlet, albeit an important
one. This may not be an issue in the current study, but it is important that
researchers are aware of these types of limitations. Further, it will be im-
portant not to over-generalize the findings from any single source of data
to all forms of media. Previous research shows that media outlets have a
range of incentives that can affect the way they collect, cover, and portray
news about firms. For example, prior research shows that some (but not all)
media outlets’ coverage or treatment of an issue may be influenced by the
possibility that the covered firms will adjust their advertising (Reuter and
Zitzewitz [2006], Gurun and Butler [2012]). Similarly, as discussed above,
evidence that news outlets slant coverage to match readers’ tastes and pref-
erences (at least for political coverage) also means we have to be cautious
about relying on limited sources of media coverage.
6. Political Forces and Disclosure
A large literature examines the impact of government on accounting in-
formation, but most of that literature examines how changes in regulation
affect disclosure and the associated capital market outcomes (e.g., the ef-
fect of SEC Regulation FD or the Sarbanes Oxley legislation). These papers
generally examine whether a regulatory change achieves its objective as well
as whether there are any unintended consequences. The impact of regula-
tion is clearly an important research topic, which justifies the large amount
of research in this area. However, the government likely influences capital
markets in more subtle ways as well, and these deserve more attention.
Watts and Zimmerman’s [1986] “political cost hypothesis” is an early
attempt to understand the role of government beyond the direct effects
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of regulation. Watts and Zimmerman argue that the fear of government
scrutiny and its associated costs or the desire for wealth transfers in the
regulatory process provides managers with incentives to manage earnings
downwards. There is some empirical support for these predictions (Wong
[1988], Cahan [1992], Key [1997], Han and Wang [1998]).
While this literature shows that the political process provides managers
with incentives to manage reported earnings, it generally does not consider
whether managers attempt to manage their firms’ information environ-
ments in other ways. Patten and Trompeter [2003] examine the response
of chemical firms to a deadly leak in a Union Carbide plant in India. While
they find that managers of chemical firms manage earnings downward dur-
ing this period of high scrutiny, they also show that firms with higher levels
of voluntary disclosure exhibit less downward manipulation. This suggests
that voluntary disclosure also affects firms’ relations with the government
and the associated political costs. Eng and Mak [2003] further investigate
the relation between voluntary disclosure and the government by showing
that higher governmental investment in Singaporean firms is associated
with greater levels of disclosure. This work suggests that political and regu-
latory incentives may affect firms’ disclosure choices, but this area remains
relatively undeveloped.
A closely related stream of research examines the accounting or busi-
ness decisions of government controlled entities and how they relate to
political incentives. Perhaps closest to the political cost hypothesis, Kido,
Petacchi, and Weber [2012] examine financial statement manipulation by
state governments in the United States to more favorably portray their eco-
nomic health during election years. These authors show that states make
discretionary choices that generally increase current reported earnings,
which presumably helps incumbent politicians gain reelection. Several pa-
pers on government-owned banks show similar patterns of behavior in loan
decisions. For example, government banks increase lending during elec-
tion years (Dinc [2005]) and change their lending in election years based
on election outcomes and the strength of local political parties (Sapienza
[2004], Micco, Panizza, and Yanez, [2007]). Overall, this literature suggests
that government-owned entities manipulate accounting information and
take real actions to support their political interests. This raises the question
of whether nongovernmental entities are likely to take similar steps in their
own political interests.
Piotroski, Wong, and Zhang [2015] investigate the suppression of nega-
tive information before important political events in China. They predict
that firms suppress bad news prior to and during important political events
in China to avoid embarrassing important political patrons. Their findings
support these predictions and hold for both state-owned firms, where a rela-
tively direct mechanism and incentive for disclosure exists, and in non-state-
owned firms that nominally should be freer from such influence. These
actions suggest an attempt to strategically use disclosure not just to avoid
government scrutiny or to support your current boss, but also to actively
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curry favor from political sources even for non-state-controlled firms. In
showing that these firms skew their information environment, Piotroski,
Wong, and Zhang [2015] relate to studies such as Leuz andOberholzer-Gee
[2006] and Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley [2011], which show that politically
connected firms have more opaque information environments. Piotroski,
Wong, and Zhang [2015] extend this literature by showing that the disclo-
sure decisions may be strategically adjusted over time based on political
needs, similar to the arguments made in the political cost literature.
In addition to contributing to the relatively limited literature on the di-
rect influence of government on disclosure, this paper relates to the large
literature on the impact of firm performance on disclosure. That idea is
most fully developed in the earnings forecast literature. Early work in the
area (Verrecchia [1983], Lev and Penman [1990]) argues that managers
who are evaluated based on measures of performance such as earnings will
manage the flow of information to external constituents to portray their
performance more favorably, and so accelerate the release of good news by
providing positive earnings forecasts. However, subsequent literature finds
that other factors, such as fear of legal costs or reputational damage, pro-
vide incentives for managers to disclose negative news on a more timely ba-
sis than good news when managers know the information will be revealed
(Skinner [1994], Kasznik and Lev [1995]).
These findings suggest that there is a rich and complicated interaction
between disclosure and firm performance. If there is significant cost to
withholding negative news that will soon become public, managers are
likely to divulge this news on a timely basis. However, if there is some pos-
sibility that the bad news will not be revealed (perhaps because offsetting
good news arrives before the end of the period), managers defer the rev-
elation of bad news and accelerate the revelation of good news (Kothari,
Shu, and Wysocki [2009]). Piotroski, Wong, and Zhang [2015] provide a
setting where the important actors (in this case, politicians) benefit suffi-
ciently from the deferral of bad news and there is not full ex post settling
up.
Piotroski, Wong, and Zhang [2015] exploit the strong role of the
government in China to demonstrate that politics affects firms’ disclosure
incentives. It would be useful for future research to consider whether gov-
ernments in other economies play a similar role (see Ramanna and Roy-
chowdhury [2010], for similar research in the U.S. setting). It would also
be interesting to better understand the role of other actors in this process.
For example, did the press assist in this attempt to skew information re-
garding these firms or did it attempt to act as a monitor (as discussed in
the above section on the media)? Was there a difference in coverage be-
tween domestic (and presumably politically connected) media and foreign
media? What about other entities, such as auditors? Will the developing use
of social media reduce firms’ (and governmental entities’) abilities to take
these actions?
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7. Conclusion
We summarize five papers that collectively advance our understanding of
the role of disclosure in financial markets in a number of important ways.
This work enhances our understanding of how managers use conference
calls to complement how they report and disclose firm performance; how
social media changes the way that firms interact with investors as well as
the public at large; how the increased use of mobile devices affects how
investors collect and disseminate local information, which in turn affects
trading activity, and deepens our understanding of the role of crucial actors
outside the firm (the media and the government).
While the conference papers focus on how recent changes in technology
and the media affect financial markets, they also extend existing strands of
disclosure research. Both the earnings forecast and conference call litera-
tures show how new forms of disclosure are initially adopted by only a few
players in the market, but over time become more widely used. These pa-
pers provide evidence on new trends in disclosure that are likely to become
more prevalent over time, and show how the emergence of new disclosure
channels, such as social media, raises new research questions. For example,
the emergence of social media not only provides firms with a new way of
disseminating information, but also provides external users with the ability
to create and disseminate their own content. This reduces firms’ ability to
tightly manage their information environments, which means they need to
develop new disclosure strategies.
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